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while party supervision over the organization and activities of the guerrilla forces was an important factor and the basis for their success.

The Communist Party and Soviet state extended all-out assistance to guerrilla units, particularly in the training of command cadres. During the Civil War the party Central Committee, on Lenin's instructions, deployed a vast Bolshevik underground network for efficient direction of the guerrilla effort and organization of guerrilla forces. The party steadily increased party influence on the guerrilla masses and extended all-out assistance via government organizations.

The guerrilla struggle was not viewed by our party as a decisive means of defeating the enemy, since guerrilla forces were not numerous enough for this. The role of the guerrillas was important, however; guerrillas paralyzed the White Guardist rear areas, prevented the enemy from utilizing manpower reserves, and diverted enemy strength from the front. Lenin highly praised, for example, the activities of the Siberian guerrillas, who "helped our Red Army beat Kolchak." Guerrilla forces were also a substantial source of additional manpower for the Red Army.

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) was organized to combat the imperialist intelligence services and the secret agents of the domestic counterrevolutionaries. The Cheka was "an establishment which was our sharp sword wielded against numerous conspiracies and numerous attempts to overthrow the Soviet government..." (V. I. Lenin: Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 44, page 327). The Cheka laid the foundation for the security agencies of the Soviet state. Lenin, appraising the role of the Cheka, wrote that at one time "the principal combat agencies defending Soviet rule were the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Cheka" (Ibid., page 396).

Securement of observance of socialist law and order and protection of the interests of Soviet citizens was handled by the *Soviet militia*, created immediately following the October Revolution. Under the conditions of civil war the militia, as an armed organization, performed military functions and to this extent constituted a reserve for the Red Army.⁸

Thus Soviet military organization during the Civil War period constituted an aggregate of the most diversified forms, in principle of recruitment, subordination and nature of missions performed. The leading role was played by the regular Red Army. The Red Army, in coordination with other forms of military organization of our state, routed the interventionists and domestic counterrevolutionaries and defended the socialist homeland.

Improvement of Soviet Military Organization During the Period of Peaceful Building of Socialism

The victorious end to the Civil War created favorable conditions for peaceful construction in this country. Attaching primary importance to the building of socialism, Lenin and the Communist Party at the same time focused considerable attention on matters pertaining to strengthening national defense and increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. "We have completed one series of wars," stated Lenin. "Now we must prepare for another; but we do not know when it will come, and we must do everything possible so that we can handle it when it does come" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 42, pp 143-144).

The party was again faced with the problem of selection of forms of Soviet military organization. In connection with this there arose a debate on what the peacetime army should be: a regular cadre army or a volunteer militia army. This debate continued until the 10th Party Congress.

The 10th Party Congress played an exceptionally important role in determining a scientifically substantiated program of peacetime military organizational development. The congress resolutely rejected proposals for an immediate transition to a militia system, which would in fact signify disbandment of the Red Army. It was pointed out that "for the immediate future the core of our armed forces should be the present Red Army, reduced in size by discharging older personnel, with an increase in the percentage of the army of proletarian origin and with party membership." The congress demanded that the process of removing Communists from the army be stopped and that politically-weakened units be fortified with political workers and Communists.

As regards the territorial-militia system of army organization, the congress stated in its resolution that "the party has no reason to revise its program. The forms, methods and pace of transition to a militia depend entirely on the international and domestic situation, on the duration of the breathing spell, on relations between city and village, etc."⁹ A partial transition to militia units was recommended only for rayons with the most cohesive proletarian population (Petrograd, Moscow, the Urals). Thus the congress stated basic principles for implementation of a mixed system of army organizational development.

Strengthening cadre large units and units of the Red Army, the party cautiously introduced a territorial-militia structure, utilizing experience in organizing Vseobuch and the special purpose units. The essence of the partially introduced territorial-militia system, as stated in a circular letter released by the party Central Committee in May 1923, consisted in the fact that "the territorial divisions being organized should be the

equivalent in political and military-technical preparedness and combat efficiency in general to permanent field divisions, differing from the latter only in the fact that they maintain only a permanent cadre, financed by the state, comprising approximately one tenth of the wartime personnel complement; the bulk of the nonprofessional-military Red Army lower-echelon command and administrative-service personnel attached permanently to the given division, shall only periodically assemble for brief periods of training, exercises and other purposes, while the remainder of the time they are entitled to live at home and engage in civilian employment, thus requiring no expenditures for maintenance on the part of the state."¹⁰

Territorial organizational development constituted the most important component of the military reform carried out by the party in 1924-1925. In October 1924 the Red Army contained 43 territorial divisions and a cavalry brigade, which comprised 44 percent of the total number of division (brigade) units of the Red Army.¹¹

During the period of peacetime building of socialism, a powerful navy, air force, border and internal troops, grew up alongside the Red Army, comprising as an aggregate the Soviet Armed Forces. At the same time the party focused attention on the potential utilization of guerrilla forces as well in the areas of probable theaters of military operations.¹² On 18 February 1925 F. E. Dzerzhinskiy submitted to the party Central Committee a plan for organizing on Soviet territory small, strictly clandestine groups, suitably armed, for the purpose of organizing guerrilla warfare in case of need. This plan was approved by the Central Committee, and practical implementation worked out.¹³

A genuine expression of Soviet patriotism and mass creative initiative in defense of the socialist homeland was the establishment of volunteer defense organizations. Following the end of the Civil War, on 15 November 1920, a military scientific society was established on the initiative of Communist members of the General Staff Academy. M. V. Frunze was elected president of the society. This society signaled the beginning of establishment of a number of volunteer defense organizations: the Society for Assistance to the Defense of the USSR, the Society of Friends of the Air Force, the Voluntary Society for Furthering the Construction of the Chemical Industry, and Osoaviakhim. All performed missions of disseminating military knowledge among the population and teaching military occupational specialties to young people. The volunteer organizations made a major contribution toward the moral-political and military-patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet people.

The rapid development of military aviation and expansion of the area of armed combat in connection with this demanded, in addition to strengthening army air defense, organization of local air defense, which by decision

of the party Central Committee was established in October 1932. Local air defense was set up primarily in major industrial centers, and manned by industrial workers, white-collar workers, college and high-school students. Subsequent experience showed that the establishment of this organization had been the correct move.

The complex international situation at the end of the thirties, caused by imperialist preparations and initiation of World War II, demanded a full shift to the regular cadre principle of armed forces organizational development. By this time, thanks to the successful building of socialism, the economic, sociopolitical and organizational prerequisites had been created for implementation of this principle and elimination of class restrictions to military service. On 1 September 1939 the USSR law on universal military obligation was promulgated, establishing a uniform system of cadre organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Thus the party laid the organizational foundation for our victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Soviet Military Organization During the Period of the Great Patriotic War

The Great Patriotic War constituted a stern test not only of the economic, political and spiritual resources of our society, but of its military organization as well. As is well known, in making preparations to attack the Soviet Union, by June 1941 the German High Command had increased its regular armed forces to 3,500,000 men. Of this total number, 4,600,000, and a total of 5,500,000 together with the troops of Germany's satellites, were allocated for the attack on the Soviet Union.¹⁴ The Nazi German troops designated for executing Plan Barbarossa were not only mobilized and trained in advance but also possessed experience in conducting large-scale military campaigns. They were supported by the resources of the subjugated nations of almost all Europe.

As of 1 June 1941 the Soviet Armed Forces totaled approximately 5,000,000 men, 2,900,000 of whom were deployed in the western frontier districts.¹⁵ Thus at the moment of the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, the German invasion army was almost twice the size of our forces stationed in the western border districts, and was even somewhat larger than our total armed forces. Under conditions of a sneak attack and such a substantial inequality in numbers, it became extremely urgent to achieve further development and improvement of Soviet military organization, bringing it fully to bear against the powerful and treacherous enemy. The process of solving this problem vividly revealed the exceptional organizational talents of our party and the basic superiority of the socialist societal and governmental system.

During the first hours of the war the party Central Committee took resolute measures to mobilize the entire Soviet people to resist the foe. The

fundamental program document on the basis of which Soviet military organization was improved and mobilization of the nation for the struggle against fascism was effected, was the 29 June 1941 directive of the Council of People's Commissars USSR and party Central Committee to party and soviet organizations in the oblasts along the front. The party and government raised the Soviet nation up in a holy war against the aggressor.

A vivid expression of national patriotism and love of the Soviet homeland was establishment of a *volunteer militia*, initiated by the Communists and worker class of Moscow and Leningrad. The difficulties of the initial period of war required the most vigorous mobilization of resources to resist the foe. The people's militia was one of the forms of accelerated mustering of regular armed forces on a volunteer basis. It was created under the guidance of party organizations, the bureaus and committees of which were frequently transformed into mobilization headquarters, with the assistance of military commissariats. The resources of enterprises, public organizations and the population at large were used in addition to centralized state funds to establish this militia. In the summer and fall of 1941, at the initiative of the party organizations of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Khar'kov, Smolensk, Odessa, Sevastopol', Tula and other cities, approximately 60 people's militia divisions were formed, plus 200 separate regiments, a large number of subunits (battalions, companies, detachments), totaling almost 2 million men. More than 40 local volunteer defense force divisions were incorporated into the army in the field. Many of them saw combat and performed valiantly, ultimately prosecuting the war far beyond Soviet borders. During the war a large number of people's militia or local volunteer defense force units were employed as reserves to replenish the regular large units of the army in the field.¹⁶

At the initiative of party organizations, during the first phase of the Great Patriotic War *Communist units and large units were formed of volunteers -- Communists, Komsomol members and non-party patriots*. The formation of these units promoted rapid mobilization and strengthening of the armed forces, which were fighting under exceptionally difficult conditions during the initial years of the war. A total of 150 Communist units and large units were formed, which were incorporated into the army in the field.

A variant of the local volunteer defense unit was the *assault or commando battalion*. These were the first volunteer units set up on a popular militia basis at the initiative of party organizations. The local volunteer defense force units performed combat missions side by side with regular troops at the front, while the commando battalions had a specific mission -- to engage hostile paratroops, enemy spies and saboteurs in the areas along the front. By the end of July 1941 a total of 1755 commando battalions, totaling more than 328,000 men, had been organized in the front regions.¹⁷

The experience of the Civil War in organizing Vsevobuch was utilized in training armed forces reserves. On 17 September 1941 the State Defense Committee issued a decree entitled "Universal Mandatory Military Training for Soviet Citizens." During the Great Patriotic War 9,862,000 persons¹⁸ received basic military training in the Vsevobuch system while performing their normal employment duties. Vsevobuch was disbanded at the end of the war.

The party and government devoted serious attention to antiaircraft defense of cities and antichemical defense of the civilian population. On 2 July 1941 the Soviet government issued a decree entitled "Universal Mandatory Training of the Civilian Population for Antiaircraft Defense." Existing local air defense entities were strengthened and new ones set up -- factory units and self-defense groups. Males between the ages of 16 and 60 and females between the ages of 18 and 50 were compelled to participate in self-defense groups set up at enterprises, offices and apartment house management offices. These groups trained during off-duty hours. Personnel of the Osoaviakhim volunteer society supervised civilian training for anti-aircraft and antichemical defense.

By the end of the war local air defense units contained a total of approximately 1 million persons, while more than 5 million were active in self-defense groups.¹⁹ During the Great Patriotic War local air defense played an important role in defending industrial installations against air attacks, in preventing and extinguishing fires started by incendiary bombs, in repairing damaged utility lines, etc. Local air defense was particularly important in such cities as Moscow and Leningrad.

During the Great Patriotic War, when the Soviet nation was defending the socialist homeland with weapon in hand, *guerrilla forces were employed against the enemy*, just as in the Civil War. On Hitler's orders the Germans brutally murdered guerrillas; declaring them bandits, they refused to take prisoners. This Nazi "motivation" is used today by the spiritual successors of fascism -- the American imperialists and their accomplices, who are waging war against freedom-loving peoples. The lie is obvious and is aimed at casting doubt upon the political essence of the popular guerrilla effort. According to incomplete statistics, more than 6200 guerrilla detachments and groups, totaling more than 1,300,000 patriots, were operating on temporarily-occupied Soviet territory. In scope of operations and character of missions performed, the guerrilla movement during the Great Patriotic War was transformed into a factor of strategic significance.²⁰

The Soviet Armed Forces were the principal and decisive element of the Soviet military organization, securing total defeat of the enemy. The other forms named above were supplementary elements, strengthened the

regular Soviet Army and Navy, and helped them successfully accomplish their missions. It is important to note that the mass popular movement under the guidance of the Communist Party in defense of the homeland served during the Great Patriotic War as a source of further development of earlier-originated as well as the creation of new forms of military organization.

* * *

The historical conditions of the postwar period critically restated the problem of Soviet military organization and the forms of its development. In resolving this problem, the Communist Party takes into consideration both the experience of the past and the political and economic changes taking place not only in this country but throughout the world, the character of the present era, as well as the new stage in the development of military affairs.

The aggressive nature of imperialism and the danger it presents to peace, freedom, and independence of peoples has been manifested in recent years with renewed force. The responsibility of our homeland for the fate of peace, socialism and the building of Communism increases with an intensification of the aggressiveness of imperialism, and U.S. imperialism in particular. Therefore, in pursuing a policy of peace, the CPSU and Soviet government focus serious attention on the problem of strengthening the Soviet military organization and increasing our homeland's defense capability.

Taking into consideration historical experience and trends in the development of military affairs, the party focuses *principal attention on improving Soviet Armed Forces, on increasing their combat might and combat readiness*. A vivid manifestation of this was the Law on Universal Military Obligation adopted on 12 October 1967 by the Supreme Soviet USSR. Strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces is promoted by the great social changes, growth in political activeness and general educational level of the Soviet people, as well as radical changes in military hardware. Profound qualitative changes in the structure of the armed forces have taken place on the basis of adoption of missiles and nuclear weapons. Along with their further development, as emphasized by L. I. Brezhnev, it is necessary to *improve civil defense, and to improve military patriotic efforts among the toilers, particularly young people; the entire party, the entire Soviet public must constantly focus on this task*.


In a present-day war, if the imperialists initiate one, if missiles, nuclear devices and other means of mass destruction are employed, *the demarcation lines between front and rear areas will be effaced*. More complex tasks of defending the rear areas have demanded radical reorganization of local air defense. It has evolved into *USSR civil defense* -- a

permanent form of military organization set up on a voluntary defense force-territorial basis. The main function of civil defense is protection of the civilian population, industrial and other installations against weapons of mass destruction. Government supervision and mass initiative are closely linked in civil defense.

At the present time an important contribution toward strengthening our homeland's defense capability is being made by the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF). "The main task of DOSAAF," we read in the 7 May 1966 Decree of the Central Committee CPSU and Council of Ministers USSR, "shall continue in the future to be active assistance in strengthening this nation's defense capability and training toilers to defend the socialist homeland."²¹

As history attests, Soviet military organization comprises at each stage an aggregate of governmental, government-public and public (military-patriotic) organizations carrying out armed defense of the socialist homeland or directly preparing the members of society for such defense.

Structure of Soviet military organization is closely linked with the political organization of Soviet society, its fundamental elements.



Key to diagram: 1 -- CPSU; 2 -- Soviet state (state legislative and executive bodies); 3 -- public organizations; 4 -- Soviet military organization;

(Key to diagram on preceding page, continued) 5 -- state organizations; 6 -- public-state organizations; 7 -- military-patriotic organizations; 8 -- Soviet Armed Forces; 9 -- Soviet Army and Navy; 10 -- border troops; 11 -- Internal Troops; 12 -- State Security Agencies; 13 -- militia; 14 -- Red Guard; 15 -- Vseovobuch troops; 16 -- special purpose units; 17 -- civil defense; 18 -- partisan forces; 19 -- local volunteer defense force, commando battalions; 20 -- local air defense; 21 -- Military Scientific Society, Society for Assistance to the Defense of the USSR; 22 -- Society of Friends of the Air Force; 23 -- Voluntary Society for Furthering the Construction of the Chemical Industry; 24 -- Osoaviakhim; 25 -- DOSAAF

Of course the role of the forms of military organization specified in the diagram is specific and unidentical. As in the system of political organization of society the main instrument of struggle to assert socialism is the Soviet state, led and directed by the Communist Party, in the system of Soviet military organization of pivotal importance in performing the specified missions are governmental forms, and particularly the Soviet Armed Forces. They are the basis of Soviet military organization.

But in spite of a differing role in armed combat, as well as differing formations, methods and modes of guidance, all the above-mentioned forms of Soviet military organization have been essential at one stage or another of our country's historical development. They are all an exact copy of the societal and governmental structure, are profoundly popular and serve a single aim -- defense of the socialist homeland.

In connection with increased tasks connected with defending socialism and building Communism, the role of the Communist Party is becoming more important in determining the most expedient forms of Soviet military organization and their prompt development. Perfecting Soviet military organization and making its contribution toward strengthening the Warsaw Pact Organization, the CPSU is ensuring the strength and invincibility of the forces of peace and socialism.

FOOTNOTES

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6. Computed by the authors from figures cited by S. F. Nayda in O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR (Some Problems of the History of the Civil War in the USSR), Voenizdat, 1958, page 53.
7. See Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya (Soviet Historical Encyclopedia), Volume 11, 1968, page 598.
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LIMITED WARFARE IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

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U.S. foreign policy has always been characterized by aggressive aspirations. The U.S. Army and Navy, implementing the foreign policy plans of the monopolies, have on numerous occasions been involved in limited-scope overseas military adventures. These include aggressive campaigns against the North African countries in the last century, and brigand actions against the countries of the Mediterranean, particularly the Arab state of Tripolitania. The magazine U.S. News and World Report has calculated that during the first 3 decades of this century U.S. troops have invaded Latin American soil more than 30 times. The U.S. Army has twice scourged the Philippines with fire and sword.

Also well known is the reactionary role played by the aggressors from across the sea in organizing "crusades" against the young Soviet Republic. In the spring of 1918 the U.S. Navy and Marines hastened to come to the aid of the Anglo-French troops and landed at Murmansk. Invaders in American uniforms helped overthrow Soviet authority in the North and instituted a reign of terror there. American interventionists also added black pages to the history of our Far East.

U.S. foreign policy became particularly aggressive following World War II. Its principal aim was the gaining of world supremacy. U.S. Air Force ideologue Professor John Kieffer stated in his book entitled Realities of World Power, published in 1952, that the United States should extend its power to the remotest corners of the earth. U.S. troops should dot the territory of dozens of countries... Tomorrow's battlefield is the entire world. Today the task consists in securing throughout the world as many strategically important points as possible and to train troops in the process of seizing these areas.

In the postwar years the peoples of the world were witnesses to one aggressive action after another perpetrated by the American imperialists. The United States took part in crushing the national liberation movement in Indonesia in 1945-1948. In 1948 a reactionary coup was organized with their assistance. In 1950 they occupied the Chinese island of Taiwan. The Pentagon waged an aggressive, bloody war against the PKC from 1951 through 1953. In 1962 an attempt was made to invade Cuba. The United States has inspired and executed provocations and plots against Argentina, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Laos, and Cyprus.

Events of recent years clearly demonstrate that U.S. imperialist circles have no intention of departing from their patently aggressive course.

The frenzied arms race, the aggression in Indochina and the events in the Near East are vivid examples of the predatory nature of American imperialism.

"The aggressive policies of imperialism," state the documents of the International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties, "are based on an endeavor to weaken the position of socialism with all possible means, to put down the national liberation movement of peoples, to hinder the toiler struggle in the capitalist countries and to halt the irreversible process of the decline of capitalism."¹ The United States of America is the main force of aggression and war.

As is well known, U.S. ruling circles are placing main emphasis on the development of missiles and nuclear weapons, on preparations for a nuclear world war. This aim was and still is the leitmotif of their military doctrine, of all practical activities pertaining to armed forces organizational development. At the same time, under the effect of major changes favoring the forces of peace and socialism, there is occurring an inexorable process of weakening of the positions of imperialism in the world arena. This has been caused first of all by a major change in the world balance of power in favor of socialism, in connection with growth of the economic and military might of the USSR and all nations of the socialist commonwealth, and secondly by successes in the national liberation movement which have led to the collapse of colonial systems and an intensification of the class struggle by the toilers of the capitalist nations against their exploiters, for democracy and peace.

American strategists must take this into account. At the beginning of the sixties they came to the conclusion that the United States should not rely solely on total nuclear war as the sole form of potential armed conflicts, that more flexible and consequently and more promising means and methods of resolving foreign policy problems are needed. Military scientists recommended so-called limited warfare to U.S. political leaders as an appropriate method.

The ideas of the authors of numerous books² dedicated to elaboration of a theory of "limited wars" boiled down to the conclusion that they should be limited in goals, means, territory, objectives, weapons, troops, time, and pace.

American military theorists claim that one of the causes of orientation toward limited warfare was the necessity of combatting the national liberation movement under the new conditions which had formed in the world arena.

Exposing the reactionary character of so-called "small" or limited imperialist wars, Lenin wrote in 1917: "...Take the history of those small wars they (the imperialists -- V. P.) waged prior to the Great War --

'small' because few Europeans were killed in them, and yet there did perish hundreds of thousands of members of those peoples which they were strangling, which from their viewpoint are not even peoples (Asians, Africans -- are these peoples?)..." (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 32, page 86).

The essence of the strategy of American imperialism pertaining to those countries which are struggling for their liberation consists in retaining them within the world system of capitalism. Limited warfare is proposed as a method of resolving this problem; in the opinion of American theorists limited warfare can be of inestimable aid to American foreign policy, giving the United States the opportunity to influence events, not simply to react to them.

U.S. imperialism, utilizing limited wars, is counting heavily on militarily crushing the national liberation movement throughout the world with the aid of conventional arms alone. As regards the use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited wars, American theorists do not yet have a unanimity of views on this matter. One group, headed by the current Special Adviser to the President on National Security, Henry Kissinger, believes that utilization of tactical nuclear weapons will enable the United States to conduct such wars at moderate cost. Another group, headed by prominent American theorist H. Morgenthau, believes that with use of tactical nuclear weapons it is very difficult to keep a war limited, to prevent it from becoming a nuclear world war. In any case the development and operational adoption of tactical nuclear weapons, including small ones, is continuing. The United States and NATO are also continuing to investigate the possibilities of limited nuclear warfare in Europe as well. All this makes the so-called doctrine of "limited warfare" extremely dangerous in the long run.

Therefore the summary declaration adopted at the International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties in Moscow on 17 June 1969 states: "Armed intervention and cruel acts of repression -- particularly where the struggle assumes especially acute forms and where revolutionary forces are fighting with weapon in hand -- counterrevolutionary plots, reactionary and fascist coups, acts of provocation and blackmail -- all these techniques are being employed by imperialism."³

The events of past years indicate that initially American imperialism, waging limited wars, achieved only a modicum of success. On occasion it has succeeded in crushing the national liberation movement in a number of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. But these were specific, insignificant successes.

Following World War II the United States undertook military actions within the framework of the limited war in Korea; as is well known, these efforts produced no military-political success whatsoever.

This failed, however, to cool the ardor of the American politicians and strategists. They resolved to put the doctrine of "limited warfare" to another and more fundamental test, this time in Vietnam. U.S. ruling circles were hoping to destroy a socialist outpost in Asia and to establish on the territory of South Vietnam a major bridgehead for escalating the struggle against the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia. U.S. imperialism was extremely anxious to control the major strategic areas of Indochina, since important sea and air lines of communication pass precisely through this region. This area is the source of 39 types of raw materials which are of vital importance to the U.S. economy. In addition, Southeast Asia is a giant market for the disposal of products and an inexhaustible area for the investment of capital. These are the major factors guiding U.S. foreign policy and compelling the United States to continue escalating the war in Indochina.

Policy of Adventurism, Aggression and Plunder

In scope and scale the American aggression in Vietnam has been the biggest military invasion since World War II. This limited war, which is not producing victory, is demanding continually greater efforts. In 1960 there were 800 American military personnel in South Vietnam, 2000 in 1961, 15,500 in 1963, 128,000 by the end of 1965, and 500,000 by 1970. The number of U.S. troops in Vietnam has now declined to 300,000, but the Saigon army has in the meantime grown to 1 million men.

U.S. military expenditures connected with the war in Indochina and the continuing arms race are also rapidly growing. They totaled 57 billion dollars in 1964-1965. According to the proposed federal budget for the 1972 fiscal year, which begins on 1 July 1971, Washington's military expenditures (including concealed military expenditures by all agencies) will total approximately 100 billion dollars, which is much greater than anticipated military expenditures in the 1971 fiscal year. This increase in U.S. military expenditures attests to the fact that the White House intends to continue pursuing its perilous foreign policy aimed at settling major international questions "from a position of strength." An analysis of U.S. military expenditures confirms the fact that the Americans are still counting on a further increase both in the size of strategic nuclear forces and in the means of waging limited wars.

The total bankruptcy of the adventurist American doctrine of "limited warfare" has been clearly revealed in the war against Vietnam.

The cost of the Pentagon's military efforts in Vietnam is already exceeding 100 billion dollars. And yet the United States is no closer to a military victory today than it was at the outbreak of the war. The United States has lost in this war more than 330,000 casualties, dead and wounded, and more than 7000 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters." But no end is in sight. The conflict has become a long, drawn-out and increasingly bloody war.

The dynamics of expansion of the arsenal of weapons with which this dirty war is being waged is extremely characteristic of U.S. policy. Initially the Pentagon, counting on an air war, made some restrictions in employment of services, military hardware and methods of warfare. Now that they have become enmired in the quagmire of the Vietnam aggression, American military leaders are now employing all services and arms, and all nonnuclear weapons. Vietnam has become a bloody proving ground, where all modern military hardware is being extensively utilized.

Air attacks on Vietnam are presently being flown by approximately 50 B-52 strategic bombers, 300 carrier-based attack aircraft, 1400 fighter-bombers, more than 3000 helicopters, supported by a large part of the Seventh Fleet, including aircraft carriers.

The experience of the war in Indochina convincingly demonstrates that the interventionist army, schooled by the Pentagon generals, is willing to commit any crime in the struggle against the South Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian patriots. The endeavor to justify their inhuman methods by talk of the necessity to "save the lives of American soldiers" is now presented as the official posture of the U.S. government and military command. It is not surprising that American observer James Reston cynically writes that death is becoming the official measuring stick of U.S. success.

The U.S. Army is conducting the war in Indochina according to the principle of organized banditry and genocide. Over the last decade the interventionists have, according to the most modest estimates, killed more than 170,000 civilians in South Vietnam alone; more than 500,000 have been imprisoned.⁵

Condemning U.S. crimes in Vietnam, L. I. Brezhnev stated: "The crimes being committed by the American military in Vietnam revive memories of the crimes committed by the Nazi monsters. The murder of tens of thousands of civilians, the methodical destruction of cities and villages, the reduction to rubble of schools and hospitals and the destruction of crops mark the disgraceful path trod by the American interventionists on Vietnamese soil."⁶

U.S. military policy, which is manifested in an accelerating arms race and escalation of the aggressive aspirations of the "brass hats" in the Pentagon, is generating a sharp upsurge in antiwar moods on the part of the

American people and U.S. military personnel. This trend toward an increase in antiwar attitudes is completely understandable. Very typical in this respect is a statement made by prominent American sociologist [Rayt Millis]: "...Defense of the peace, coexistence, and opposition to war have not been a popular phenomenon in the United States, but today a powerful stream of peace attitudes is beginning to burst forth from under the outer covering of bragging and boasting... More and more Americans are beginning to heed the warnings and appeals of those who are standing up to be counted for peace."⁷

The wave of antiwar sentiment in the United States is continuing to grow, encompassing increasingly larger segments not only of the civilian population but also of the soldier masses as well, particularly those who have been cast into the fiery furnace of the Vietnam war. These sentiments are manifested particularly in the military desertion rate. Approximately 60,000 men deserted from the American armed forces in 1967-1968 alone.⁸ The scale of desertion has increased in recent years. This naturally has an adverse effect on morale in the army. In response the military is intensifying repressive actions. The population of U.S. military prisons has tripled in recent years.⁹

Antiwar organizations are being established in the U.S. Army. In 1967 the "Union of American Servicemen" was organized, with a membership in excess of 10,000. It publishes a semilegal newspaper, which publicizes the antiwar effort within the military. Recently a new organization was established in the United States, the "Movement of Officers Concerned by the War." In 1970 28 of its members began to speak at antiwar rallies. The number of antiwar demonstrations by enlisted personnel and junior officers at military bases in the United States, on Okinawa and in Vietnam is continuing to grow.

Today one can hear more and more frequently in the United States the view expressed that the Vietnam war has become the most unpopular in the nation's history. The criminal methods which the U.S. Army is unsuccessfully employing in Vietnam are evoking universal, sharp censure.

The failure of the American doctrine of "limited warfare" in Vietnam has been dictated by the laws of history. The vivid example of the heroic resistance on the part of patriotic forces in South Vietnam persuasively attests to the fact that the people and army, struggling consistently and selflessly against imperialism, for freedom and independence, and with the support of the Soviet Union as well as all socialist nations and progressive elements throughout the world, are invincible. The strength of struggling Vietnam lies in the courage and steadfastness of its people and army, in the powerful support offered by the nations of the socialist commonwealth. These are constant factors in the future victory of the

Vietnamese people. A. N. Kosygin stated this January in reply to questions put to him by the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun: "The USSR and the other socialist nations will give the peoples of Indochina total support in repulsing the armed imperialist intervention."¹⁰

Even foreign military experts, predicting the outcome of the war, believe that the United States will fail in its calculations, counting on military strength and sophisticated warfare techniques. The New York Times, for example, contained the following admission: "...The Vietnam conflict has massively intensified its negative effect on American society and on relations between the United States and its disheartened friends abroad."¹¹ Larry O'Brien, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, stated: "All talk of a military victory in Indochina is absurd."¹²

Thus the Vietnam experience has demonstrated that in an unjust colonial war no strategy or tactics of "limited warfare" can guarantee achievement of the goals of a foreign policy of aggression, adventurism, and plunder.

New Methods, Old Objectives

How do U.S. ruling circles react to the obvious failures in Southeast Asia of a foreign policy based on the doctrine of "limited war"? How do the bosses of American imperialism react to the continuing growth in the number of opponents of America's Vietnam adventure, its baneful influence on the nation's economy, and bitter protests by the American public in connection with the enormous cost in human lives?

Essentially U.S. ruling circles have not altered their military-political aims and calculations, which call for a military solution to the Vietnam and entire Indochina problem. At the same time they are endeavoring to change some of the methods and means of implementing this policy. U.S. military and political leaders, maneuvering desperately, proclaimed the so-called "Guam Doctrine."

This doctrine of course does not signify a new U.S. foreign policy course. It should be examined, however.

Just what is the "Guam Doctrine"? In the summer of 1969 U.S. President Nixon visited several Asian countries. On 27 July he delivered a famous speech on Guam, described by American propaganda as the beginning of a "new policy" by Washington in regard to Asia. This policy toward Southeast Asia was dubbed the "Guam Doctrine." Nixon declared that although "the United States is resolved to honor its treaty obligations in the Pacific area, it will refrain in the future from involvement in wars such as that in Vietnam and will cut back on its military obligations throughout non-Communist Asia."¹³

On 28 July 1969 in Bangkok, as if further developing his idea, Nixon declared the following: "Geography and common interests bind the United States with the nations of Southeast Asia. We view the Pacific Ocean not as a barrier but rather as a bridge... Our firm intention to honor our obligations is in full agreement with our conviction that the nations of Asia can and must bear an increasing share of the responsibility..."¹⁴

Analysis of the "Guam Doctrine" clearly shows that U.S. military-political circles, while resorting to new terminology, have in no way altered their overall goals. The political and strategic principles of imperialism on the far shore of the Pacific have fully retained their reactionary substance and orientation.

The new U.S. "Asian" doctrine signifies that American ruling circles are merely endeavoring to change in some manner the tactics and methods used in undermining the positions of socialism, in crushing the national liberation movement, in consolidating present and seizing new military bridgeheads in Southeast Asia. They wish thereby to unload the bulk of the military burden onto the shoulders of their Asian partners. In case of an extraordinary threat an American corps-size landing task force, in their opinion, would be capable of saving puppet regimes.

Secretary of State Rogers, discussing the "Guam Doctrine," stated on 15 July 1970 that it was explained at a meeting of the SEATO members that this doctrine should by no means be construed as an indication of lack of resolve or that "we shall not honor our treaty obligations."

In the summer of 1969 an article appeared in the New York Times which revealed the essence of "Vietnamization" of the war: "The withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. soldiers and a statement by President Nixon that he hoped to bring home the bulk of U.S. ground forces signaled the first stage of the strategy of Vietnamization. The essence of this strategy is based on strengthening and modernizing the South Vietnamese Army and on the beginning of a gradual transfer of the major combat missions to this army."¹⁵

The U.S. government is intensively increasing the size of South Vietnam's Army and is rearming and reequipping it. It will cost 6.2 billion dollars to carry out the entire plan of reequipping this army and increasing its size to 1,100,000 men.

On 3 November 1969 Nixon stated in a television address, explaining the Vietnam problem, that the United States would meet all its treaty obligations. He promised to provide a shield if any nuclear power threatened the freedom of an ally or a country whose integrity the United States considered vitally important. Finally Nixon stated that in other cases the

United States would offer military and economic assistance whenever such assistance was requested in conformity with U.S. treaty obligations. At the same time he expressed the hope that the threatened nation would assume the bulk of the responsibility for providing its own defense. Many persons in the United States asked themselves the question of why the President had made this speech. The newspaper Washington Post stated: "The answer must be sought in the President's past. Anti-Communism is deep-seated in him, engendered by years of cold war. His anti-Communism occupies a central position in his notion on how the war must be brought to an end."¹⁶

The government of the DRV stated in reference to this speech that President Nixon did not want to end the war but rather to "Vietnamize" it, that is to compel Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese for the sake of the selfish aims of the warmongers. The government of the DRV viewed this speech as a challenge to the Vietnamese people, to the peoples of the entire world and progressive elements in the United States, who were resolutely demanding that the Nixon Administration end the aggression in Vietnam.

At a preelection rally of toilers held on 12 June 1970 L. I. Brezhnev stated: "...We know that the only way not to err in politics is to believe practical deeds and not verbal declarations. We cannot help but see that the peaceful declarations of the new administration in the United States are contrary to U.S. aggressive actions..."

In May 1970 U.S. Secretary of State Rogers stated at a press conference that the United States did not intend to permit American troops to take part in events in Cambodia in support of the current or any other regime in that country. Such is the value of verbal declarations.

Escalation Continues

In practice "Vietnamization" has resulted in the war spreading beyond the borders of Vietnam. In the summer of 1970 U.S. and Saigon troops invaded Cambodia. For a period of 2 months a 32,000-man American force and a 48,000-man Saigon army, with massive U.S. air support, conducted approximately 10 major operations against Cambodian patriot forces.¹⁷ Following the withdrawal of American troops from Cambodia, the puppet Saigon army has been continuing the policy of "pacification" in Cambodia.

Washington officials claim that they achieved their military objectives in Cambodia. But in fact the position of the Lon Nol government is still shaky, in spite of assistance by South Vietnamese armed forces. It is therefore not surprising that James Reston wrote in the New York Times: "Cambodia introduces an additional element of disenchantment for an administration which has so many other problems. The more this administration does, the more there remains to be done in Cambodia and elsewhere..."

In short, the Nixon Administration has gotten itself into another scrape."¹⁸ Senate Democratic Majority Leader Mansfield views the Cambodian adventure as "another Vietnam." The best confirmation is the fact the patriots of South Vietnam and Cambodia are continuing to step up military efforts against the interventionists and are inflicting increasingly heavy losses on them.

On 31 July 1970 the New York Times carried an article by Eugene McCarthy entitled "The Failure of Vietnamization under any Name." McCarthy correctly stated: "How many times are we going to proclaim a new policy of Vietnamization and how many times are we going to attempt to implement such a policy before we recognize its failure and endeavor to end the war in Vietnam by genuinely political means -- at the conference table."¹⁹

It is now quite obvious that in fact plans for "Vietnamization" are plans for a new escalation of the war in Indochina. Appraising U.S. aggressive actions in Indochina in 1970, expressed in renewal of the periodic bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and a stepped-up air war and chemical warfare in South Vietnam and Cambodia as well as stepped-up military pressure by Saigon on the Cambodian patriotic forces and strengthening of the Saigon army, the French newspaper Figaro correctly notes: "There can be no illusion. We are witnessing another reescalation."²⁰

New evidence of the fact that Washington and the Pentagon have "reescalated" the war in Indochina is offered by the events of this winter. At the end of January and the beginning of February, following massive airstrikes by several hundred U.S. Air Force aircraft, an invasion of Laos began. As the New York Times reported, a large force entered the southern part of Laos at the first stage of the operation. Ground actions were supported by hundreds of combat and transport helicopters.²¹ Almost simultaneously a 10,000-man Saigon force invaded Cambodia.

Thus escalation of the intervention had now involved a third country -- Laos. The aggressive war now rages throughout the Indochina Peninsula. "The ruling circles of the United States of America bear the entire burden of responsibility for further aggravation of the situation in Laos as well as in Indochina as a whole," states a 4 February 1971 TASS statement.²²

The spread of the war to the entire Indochina Peninsula is vivid evidence of the fact that the United States is continuing to pursue a dangerous, adventuristic foreign policy. It is obvious that they have no intention of withdrawing from their limited war in this region. A rather frank admission was made in this connection by General Wheeler, who until recently held the post of Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Appraising the aims of the current U.S. military-political leadership, he emphasized:

"Our aims -- to contain Communism and to maintain the world balance of power -- have not changed, nor have the other elements of our global strategy."²³

The American imperialists will fail in their attempts to achieve political and strategic objectives by means of Asian hands. The above-quoted TASS statement goes on: "There is no doubt whatsoever that imperialist attempts to crush the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Indochina are doomed to failure." The only right solution to the Indochina problem is a political settlement based on respect for the national interests of the peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The way to end this dirty war has been pointed out time and again in statements by Vietnamese political leaders and has been confirmed by many leaders of socialist nations: total and unconditional withdrawal of all American troops and the troops of their puppet regimes from South Vietnam.

The American imperialists, however, are continuing to persist in their attempt to achieve their goals in Vietnam by force of arms. In connection with this it is essential to strengthen the international unity of progressive, democratic, peace-loving forces, because only with their unity is it possible to block the path of imperialist aggression, wherever it may occur.

Counting heavily on the fighting of limited wars, U.S. military and political leaders have ever since World War II quite vigorously assisted in increasing the combat capabilities of the armies of U.S. bloc ally nations. Utilization of puppet-regime and ally armies is a component part of the doctrine of "limited wars." This is eloquently stated by the following facts. According to a statement made by Senator William Fulbright, the United States has sold or given a total of 175 billion dollars worth of arms and military assistance since 1945. In the current fiscal year alone 7 billion dollars have been spent for this purpose.²⁴ The Pentagon's official Armed Forces Journal reported that by the end of 1969 U.S. military assistance programs had resulted in delivery to aggressive bloc allies of approximately 17,000 airplanes (including 8000 combat aircraft), 20,000 units of rocket and missile hardware, 20,000 tanks, 5700 armored personnel carriers, 52,000 guns and mortars, 3.5 million rifles and carbines, 152,500 machineguns, 350,000 trucks, and 2300 combat and auxiliary ships.²⁵

Failure Is Inevitable

In summary, we can draw the following conclusions. Limited wars are aimed primarily against the national liberation movement. With their assistance imperialism is endeavoring to hold emerging nations within the sphere of capitalism, to seize and consolidate strategic positions in important

areas of the world. At the same time the United States is preparing for limited wars against individual socialist countries. Under certain conditions they plan to attempt to weaken the world socialist system. The Pentagon is continuing to elaborate theories of limited nonnuclear and nuclear wars in Europe.

Every limited war conducted by imperialist nations is based on the aggressive, predatory, adventuristic policies of reactionary forces. Any limited war on the part of imperialism is always of an unjust, predatory character and is therefore doomed to failure.

The military forces of third countries have been extensively employed in many limited military conflicts planned and prepared by American imperialism. This has been done to conceal the main organizers and instigators. A final and very vivid example is the aggression perpetrated against three Arab nations in 1967. Israel acted as a third force. The South Korean puppet army was used for an attack on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The United States recruited Cuban counterrevolutionaries for the invasion of Cuba.

On the basis of the experience of the war in Vietnam it is important to emphasize that military operations in limited wars show a dangerous tendency to spill far beyond the framework of the initial territorial boundaries. The war which was initiated in Vietnam many years ago is now being waged on a very large scale on the territory of three countries of Indochina.

An analysis of contemporary limited wars shows that as a rule the U.S. imperialists endeavor to wage them with coalitions, which include the leading nations of the aggressive blocs. This is attested by the experience of the wars in Korea and in Vietnam. The United States figures that with unified efforts it is possible much more rapidly to crush the armed forces of the victims of aggression, utilizing phony slogans of "collective" defense of the free world in order to deceive public opinion. But it is no simple matter to establish coalitions. It is made difficult by powerful interimperialist conflicts. The United States had a great deal of difficulty in obtaining even a small number of troops from South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines. The Americans succeeded in obtaining only 70 to 75 thousand men from these countries for the aggression in Vietnam. Major U.S. NATO partners refused under various pretexts to take direct part in this aggression.

American imperialism is plotting limited wars against a great number of countries which pursue policies which are not to the liking of the United States. The newspaper Washington Evening Star published the following statement by Richard Nixon on 9 June 1969: "Our country will continue in

the future to carry out its leadership role in order to establish order and stability in those areas of the world which are of importance for American interests. We shall not retreat and we shall not depart. We shall continue to take risks. We shall continue to play a leadership role."

The war in Vietnam has demonstrated the bankruptcy of the doctrine of "limited wars." The powerful, modern American war machine has in Indochina entered an impasse, a quagmire of hopeless war and cannot count on victory. The failure of this doctrine in turn has become vivid evidence of the bankruptcy of U.S. foreign policy pursued in Southeast Asia. The war in Vietnam is the culmination point of this bankruptcy in the foreign policy of American imperialism.

Ever advancing new military-political doctrines and concepts, U.S. politicians and strategists are attempting to conceal the true reasons for their failures in this area. In actual fact failure is caused by the reactionary nature of the aggressive policies of American imperialism. No modernization or new doctrines will help.

Thanks to the increased might of the nations of the socialist commonwealth and an intensification of the national liberation movement of peoples, the aggressive forces of American imperialism are receiving increasingly powerful resistance. These forces are being increasingly held in check and localized, but they continue to exist and continue to carry the threat of new military adventures.

American imperialism and its aggressive bloc partners "still hope to 'replay' the historic battles of the 20th century, to gain revenge, to cast down socialism from the summits of world influence, to restore colonialism in new forms. U.S. imperialism has become the general headquarters of anti-Communism, the focal point of international reaction and militarism..."²⁶

American imperialism, in spite of a patently aggressive foreign policy, nevertheless has failed to meet a single political and strategic aim. But it has no intention of giving up its schemes and plans, which are so dangerous to the cause of peace and international security. Within U.S. imperialism lies the source of the threat of war. The frenzied arms race, U.S. attempts to revive military-political blocs and to compel its allies to pursue more intensively an aggressive policy against the USSR and the other socialist nations, as well as active preparations for both a nuclear war and limited wars -- contain a serious danger, the fact of which we must bear in mind. It is essential to take into account thereby that in case a war is initiated, including a limited war, U.S. imperialism will commit any act of treachery. It is not mere happenstance that U.S.

theorist and ideologue Henry Kissinger stated: "...We must bear in mind that the entire future depends on our ability to make use of the unprecedented power at our command, with maximum skill and cunning."

Imperialism is doomed to failure. The crisis of U.S. foreign policy and military strategy, which reflects the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, is quite obvious. But American imperialism is doing everything it can to postpone the final collapse of the imperialist system. It is for this reason that the importance of a vigorous alliance between the world socialist system, between the international worker class and the national liberation movement is more important now than ever before. In order to hold in check even more powerfully the aggressive forces of international imperialism, and of the United States in particular, we need a high degree of vigilance and an increase in the defensive might of the Soviet Union and all Warsaw Pact nations

At an official meeting held in the city of Baku to honor the 50th anniversary of Soviet Azerbaydhan, L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "We see that acute international crises and situations dangerous to the cause of peace now and then occur in the world through the fault of the imperialists. We must realize that the imperialists are continuing the arms race and are waging a struggle against the socialist nations and the popular liberation movement with the most sophisticated means. This demands of us vigilance, constant concern for a strong national defense and a tireless struggle against aggressive imperialist intrigues."

American politicians and strategists, while continuing preparations for a thermonuclear world war, nevertheless are aware of the enormous risk such a war would bring for the entire imperialist system. This is why at the present stage they place such strong hopes on the doctrine of "limited war." But no matter what doctrines the American theorists may invent, we can state with assurance that such doctrines have no chance of success.

FOOTNOTES

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THE PROBLEM OF COMBAT AGAINST NUCLEAR SUBMARINES*

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The problem of ASW against missile-armed nuclear submarines continues to occupy a special place among the many major problems worked on at U.S. Air Force and NATO headquarters. The reason for such a persistent search for effective means of combatting nuclear submarines, in the opinion of Western military experts, is that the Soviet Navy, which has become a blue-water force, has also become a serious obstacle in the way of implementation of the aggressive aspirations of the traditional naval powers. Approximately 60 percent of the time spent on combat training in the U.S. Navy is presently devoted to ASW. Annual expenditures on development of ASW weapons alone total 3 billion dollars,¹ 400 million of which is spent on scientific research in this area.

The seriousness of the problem stands out in particular relief if one bears in mind that missile-armed nuclear submarines, as a result of the scientific and technological revolution, have become a major strategic force.

The missile-carrying nuclear submarine constitutes a highly mobile launching platform, protected by a thick layer of water, for a large number of ballistic missiles. It possesses extensive open-sea maneuver capabilities and has the capability of destroying critical targets on land from various directions and at various ranges of fire. A high degree of concealment of operations is organically inherent in a submarine, which in combination with mobility gives the submarine the greatest survivability of all strategic nuclear warhead delivering missile systems.

The great advantage of submarines over other launching sites is that submarine-fired missiles reach the target much faster than do land-launched ICBMs and therefore can more easily penetrate a hostile air defense system. Detection and destruction of missile-carrying submarines deployed at sea, protected by a thick layer of water which is impenetrable to radar and optical observation devices, is an extremely complex task. Western military experts, considering nuclear submarines invulnerable, attach great importance to the missiles they carry.

Antisubmarine Warfare

American military leaders have come to the conclusion that at the present time there does not exist any one universal means capable of

* From foreign press materials

effectively localizing the submarine threat, just as there is no single naval arm capable of independently performing all the missions involved in ASW.

U.S. naval leaders seek a way out of this situation by the establishment of so-called ASW forces. They included all vehicles carrying ASW weapons: approximately 100 submarines, including 47 nuclear powered submarines, construction of which is continuing at a stepped-up pace and will reportedly total 105 units,² more than 500 surface ships, including 11 CVSs (four on active duty and seven in reserve -- N. V.),³ as well as a large number of ASW fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.⁴ An important component of ASW forces are theater underwater situation warning systems, force control systems, special operational-scientific entities for the processing and analysis of situation data, with corresponding communications devices.

All these types of units are joined into an ASW system which has already been established, is operating in peacetime and can shift to a wartime operational footing without substantial mobilization measures. The establishment of this system pursues two objectives: to interdict nuclear attacks from the sea against land targets in the United States and to prevent hostile submarines from conducting active operations on major sea lines of communication linking the United States with its NATO partners and other aggressive military blocs. Priority is given to the first of these objectives. Therefore principal efforts are directed at detecting and classifying all underwater targets, that is, determination of whether a submarine has actually been detected and not something else: a whale, a school of fish, or an underwater obstruction. Undersea observation efforts are aimed at establishing continuous tracking of the movements of every submarine at sea.

Deployment of an ASW system in each ocean theater is effected applicable to specific military-geographic conditions.⁵

In the Atlantic a U.S. Atlantic Fleet ASW command has been set up, with headquarters at Norfolk. Its zone of operations extends from the North to South Pole, from the coast of the Americas to Europe, and in the Indian Ocean -- to the boundary between East Pakistan and Burma. The Atlantic Fleet Command supervises all surface units, aircraft and ASW submarines under its jurisdiction. When any part of these forces enters the Mediterranean, it shifts to the operational jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.

The Atlantic and Indian oceans are subdivided into various ASW zones, each of which has its corresponding command and assigned forces. The zones are laid out in such a manner that the U.S. Navy areas of

responsibility coincide with the NATO naval forces zones of responsibility, with the exception of the Northwestern Atlantic, which is under Canadian jurisdiction, and the Northeastern Atlantic, where the British are in charge.

But even in these areas Canadian and British ASW forces are reinforced by the U.S. 80th Task Force, designated primarily for seeking out and destroying, at the outbreak of war, submarines throughout the Atlantic, from the U.S. East Coast to Europe. It performs its missions in coordination with the 81st Task Force, deployed in the same area. In case of an emergency situation, plans exist for establishing the 83rd Task Force to operate in the Atlantic, consisting of HUK groups, which contain an ASW support aircraft carrier and several destroyers.⁶

Each carrier has a complement of 16 Sea King helicopters, 20 S2 Tracker fixed-wing aircraft, and several communications relay aircraft, which transmit information from the ships and aircraft to the CIC status board on the carrier.⁷

The North Atlantic is also the operations area of the 85th Task Force, which includes 15 squadrons of land-based patrol aircraft. Nine of these squadrons contain P3 Orion ASW aircraft, while the rest contain P2 Neptunes. The bases of these squadrons are dispersed in such a manner that aircraft can reach any point in the North Atlantic within 2-3 hours.⁸

Under normal peacetime conditions there are constantly on duty in the Atlantic three HUK groups, consisting of an aircraft carrier, air groups, destroyers, and ocean escorts, which have the mission of convoy protection, plus submarines.⁹

Each of these groups works on specific ASW missions against missile-carrying nuclear submarines. Group Alfa concentrates its attention on tactics, methods and general ASW operations; group Bravo practices shielding carrier striking forces; group Charlie works on convoy escort tactics.

All these forces in their operations rely on stationary undersea situation warning systems, which are set up and utilized in coordination with mobile search and destruction capabilities.

In organizing continuous surveillance American military leaders proceed from the primary aim of maintaining solid coverage of possible entrance routes into the Atlantic: the waters between South America and Africa, between the British Isles and Iceland, as well as the English Channel and the Strait of Gibraltar. These waters are under constant ASW

surveillance, while in the most important areas -- between Northern Norway and Spitsbergen, between Greenland, Iceland, the Faeroe and Shetland Islands and the Southwestern Coast of Norway, ASW lines have been established, which constitute an interlinked complex of submarine detection, classification, identification and destruction systems. These lines have been organizationally drawn and operate in peacetime, but limited ASW forces are deployed on them; these forces, however, can quickly be increased, depending on the developing situation.¹⁰ The forces permanently stationed on the ASW lines, including on the Iceland-Faeroe Islands-Norway line, in addition to surface units (frigates, destroyers, escort ships), land-based patrol aircraft and special HUK groups, include nuclear submarines. ASW patrol aircraft fly into the area of an unidentified noise source on the basis of data provided by stationary surveillance means. If they establish that the noise source is a surface ship, response action initiated by the forces deployed on the line can cease. If the source is a submarine, ASW ships are dispatched into the area.¹¹

Additional actions by these forces in peacetime include establishing contact with each submarine and continuously tracking it, regardless of its direction of movement in the ocean. If war were to break out, these actions would be culminated by utilization of various ASW weapons.¹²

It is noted that the effectiveness of stationary means is greatly increased if they are utilized in combination with mobile means of submarine surveillance -- primarily with submarines and aircraft continuously deployed on the designated lines.

In the Pacific ASW surface units and squadrons of land-based aircraft form part of the Pacific Fleet ASW forces, with headquarters at Pearl Harbor. When they move into the Western Pacific, they come under the operational control of the Commander, Seventh Fleet.

In the Pacific the main obstacles to submarine penetration are established between Hawaii and the Aleutians. But since unfavorable climatic and natural conditions limit the placement of ASW means in position on this line, maneuvering forces are employed for the most part. In order to maintain continuous surveillance of the undersea situation and to provide warning for ASW forces operating in the area of Japanese bases and ports and patrolling in the areas of potential submarine exit into the Pacific, it is considered effective to employ deep-water hydroacoustic surveillance posts.¹³

Coastal ASW zones extending 1100 km from the coastline have been set up for the purpose of detection of submarines on the far approaches

to the coast of North America.¹⁴ They include stationary active and passive hydroacoustic systems and ASW forces.

In-position long-range hydroacoustic detection systems are considered the backbone of the long-range submarine detection network. Hydroacoustic stations in the Caesar and Colossus systems are sited along the continental shelf a considerable distance from shore.¹⁵ It is noted that the effective range of the system is secret, but it is emphasized that it can be increased fivefold by employing explosive charges or other means of high-output low-frequency acoustic propagation.

It is claimed that the above-enumerated efforts to equip the theater with underwater surveillance means have led to the establishment of an operational ocean underwater situation warning system which provides valuable information to ASW forces.

The SOSUS submarine detection system is being set up in the area of the continental shelf. It consists of hydrophone hydroacoustic complexes sited on the ocean floor in probable areas of hostile submarine activity, as well as on potential routes of hostile submarine movement. These complexes are linked by communications lines with computers on shore which will classify sounds and identify submarines.¹⁶ The effective range of the system, which operates in an undersea sound [acoustic waveguide] channel, is limited only by the sound conductivity of the isothermal layer and the physical dimensions of the receiver-radiative devices. These include the Artemis system, which constitutes a complex of in-site deep-water long-range detection equipment, deployed over extensive areas.¹⁷

Operational systems include the Julie system, in which the underwater detonations of small charges are employed with the aid of radio sonobuoys for target detection and classification. Its effective range is approximately 325 km. In the Jezebel system, which operates on the same principle, a special computer device is employed for on-board correlation reception of signals from radio sonobuoys. Long-range submarine detection is also effected with low-frequency cables lying on the ocean floor (project Artemis) off the U.S. Pacific Coast. The transducer employed by this complex weighs 400 tons, operates at ultralow frequencies and can detect a submarine at a distance of more than 900 km.¹⁹

Additional studies are being conducted of other physical phenomena with the aim of their utilization in detection systems. Particular attention is being focused on seeking ways to establish submarine detection lines at ocean entry points with the aid of low-frequency

electromagnetic radiations. Other devices in the development stage include magnetometric, thermal, laser, gas analyzer, ionization and other devices. Studies are also continuing on determination of the possibility of detecting a submarine from wake infrared radiation.

Principal efforts are aimed at identification of noises produced by objects moving under water. It is stated in the press, however, that the United States does not yet possess totally automated devices which discriminate between contact with a hostile submarine and contact with a spurious target, although experimental projects have allegedly already reduced the percentage of "false alarms" in comparison with the situation 3 to 4 years ago.²⁰

An intensive effort is being made to improve control of ASW forces. The U.S. Navy is transitioning to automated data processing systems, which assist commanders at all echelons in performing these functions. The aim of experimental design projects is the creation of a unified system of interaction and coordination between vehicles carrying ASW weapons and all command echelons: from tactical units to theater commanders.²¹

Two electronic fast submarine identification centers are being built for the U.S. Navy, to be employed in the ASW system. It is believed that these centers (ASCAC) will rapidly process data on submarine contacts received from surface units, undersea sensing devices and aircraft. It is believed that when this system becomes operational it will be possible to evaluate obtained information faster and more accurately.²²

Utilization of ASW Forces

In contrast to past wars, when ASW forces were deployed at the beginning of the war, under present-day conditions their utilization is viewed as a continuation and culmination of submarine search operations conducted in peacetime. "British and American ASW forces are every day conducting something of a facsimile of a battle of the Atlantic. They have the mission of tracking Soviet submarines freely maneuvering in the waters of the Atlantic, as well as the mission of undertaking harassment actions against them. Naval ships, embarked and land-based aircraft operating from bases in the British Isles, take part in these operations, which are supervised by NATO Atlantic headquarters."²³

The Western press admits that the high speed and freedom of maneuver on the part of submarines make it possible for them successfully to evade encounter with ASW forces. In connection with this fact naval experts recommend enlargement of the zones under continuous ASW surveillance, which in their opinion will restrict submarine freedom of maneuver. It is also suggested that search zones be assigned along ASW

lines or in the immediate vicinity of those areas where submarine search is already being conducted by other forces, in order to make it more difficult for submarines to leave surveillance areas.²⁴

As for wartime, it is recommended that ASW operations be culminated with vigorous attacks on every detected submarine. The sequence and methods of operations by ASW forces in time of war can be quite varied, if one is to judge on the basis of U.S. and NATO naval exercises.

As is well known, up until the mid-fifties U.S. and NATO naval forces had the mission of totally preventing the submarines of the potential enemy from reaching the open sea by destroying them in base and during initial deployment. Today this is considered unrealistic. While not rejecting the possibility of attacking submarines in base, NATO leaders have concluded the advisability of concentrating ASW efforts on submarine routes of egress to the open ocean.²⁵ Toward this end it is planned to utilize primarily nuclear submarines deployed in the immediate vicinity of a hostile coast; these submarines would effect initial detection of hostile submarines putting out to sea, would warn ASW forces and of course would engage detected submarines with their own on-board weapons.

Single-aircraft ASW actions in certain areas would also be used against diesel-powered submarines. Patrol flights are run at a frequency which do not permit a hostile submarine to remain surfaced for long. ASW submarine stations are located in the vicinity of air-patrolled areas. The mission of these submarines is to detect the hostile submarine after it, after crossing the air-patrolled zone, exhausts its batteries and is compelled either to surface or to continue at snorkel depth, facilitating detection by ASW forces.

Finally, the third echelon of ASW forces comprises ASW HUK groups operating in the open sea. Their actions consist in establishing contact with a prior-detected submarine, tracking it down and destroying it. Normally as soon as initial submarine detection information is received from stationary surveillance devices or from submarines, embarked or land-based aircraft are sent into the search area; these aircraft place radio sonobuoys. With the assistance of these buoys surface units maintain surveillance over the undersea situation, employing embarked helicopters. The latter, which can move faster than surface units, search "in bounds," lowering detection gear into the water for a period of 2-5 minutes, after which they fly to a new point,²⁶ preventing the enemy from surfacing. Helicopter sonar operating conditions are considered better than for a surface unit, since the transducer is not in the same medium as the helicopter, while its immersion depth can easily be varied, depending on hydrologic

conditions. Helicopters have a greater submarine detection and pursuit capability because they can use in combination with hydro-acoustic devices such as passive devices as magnetic anomaly detection and infrared detection.

Another important element is the fact that at least for the present a submarine can do nothing against a helicopter. This means that the submarine must try to escape, although this is difficult due to the high speed of the pursuer.

The HUK group destroyers and frigates, operating in coordination with ASW fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, search with their sonar gear. If a submarine has been contacted by a helicopter at a great distance from the surface units, the attack can be mounted with less haste and with more precise calculation. In case of a near-in contact the helicopter can employ its own weapons or guide another helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft to the target, while maintaining contact with it. If a submarine is contacted by surface units, they endeavor to destroy it before it can attack them.

Intensified training of the imperialist navies, and the U.S. Navy in particular, in ASW, since these navies view submarines as a serious obstacle in the way of their aggressive aspirations, obliges Soviet navymen to keep a close watch on the development of ASW weapons and forces abroad, to study the techniques of their utilization, to improve their combat training performance and to do everything possible to strengthen the naval might of the Soviet Union.

FOOTNOTES

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